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Foreword 
 
The present study was effectuated in conditions of MFIs professionalization in West 
African countries. This region is peculiarly renown as holding a relatively impressive 
number of savings and credit cooperatives and unions. The current regulation in 
UMOA zone avoids the use of the term MFI. Throughout this paper, the terms DFS, 
savings and credit cooperatives, savings and credit mutuals, savings and savings 
associations will be used interchangeably.  
 
The findings, interpretations and conclusions uttered in this thesis do not necessarily 
reflect the orientation of the Université Libre de Bruxelles or the Fédération des 
Organisations Non Gouvernementales du Sénégal. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMARY 
 
The present thesis endeavours to assess the viability of the FONGS FINRURAL, a 
nascent network of 09 rural savings and credit cooperatives in Senegal. More 
specifically it strives to measure first how the social and financial performance and 
the governance vary among the network affiliated organizations, and second to what 
extent all this aspects in each MFI could affect the viability of the network.  
For cause of data availability, the research was carried on 7 out of the 9 affiliated 
MFIs. 
 
The methodology has consisted first in the exploitation of financial reports, financial 
statements, business plans, manual of procedures, minutes, reports and any kind of 
internal documents seeming useful and second in visits at basic affiliated 
associations and client information. 
 
Four data collection tools were used: the factsheet of financial assessment devised 
by BRS and ADA, the ECHOS© tool of social performance assessment of Incofin, 
version 2012, the aggregated index of governance grid, and specific interview grids 
to each MFIs based on their financial and social performance recorded and on their 
governance score as well. 
 
Financial data were collected over four years (2008-2011), while social and 
governance data were a snapshot of the MFIs as of may-august 2012. 
 
Different descriptive statistics were used for comparisons. The coefficient of 
correlation rho of Spearman was used to make links between financial performance, 
social performance and governance. 
 
It comes out from the peer group analysis that the membership of the entire seven 
MFIs, dominated by women (50%), is growing over years with an average of 23% 
sharply higher than that of the country (8.7%). This trend presents however some 
specificities pertaining to each MFI. 
 
In the same vein, the network records an increase in savings collection which is 
however concentrated within 02 MFIs (29%) which contributed for 54% of the total 
deposit of the entire network in 2011. If for the first MFI (CREC of Méckhé), the 
situation is due to the involvement of its groups membership, the second (MEC of 
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Tattaguine) owes its records to its savings policy mainly based on high rate of 
compulsory savings (33%) as requirement for loan application. 
 
Regarding the credit delivery, it appears that except ordinary loans, most of the loan 
products catered for are seasonal or working capital loans and investment loans 
(more than one year) with bullet repayment albeit variability in the loans maturity. 
To provide such credit products, MFIs rely on three main sources: the deposits, the 
borrowings and their equity. Most of the MFIs provide their loans from the member’s 
deposits and tend to report improvement of their leverage except the MEC of Dakar 
and that of Malicounda. 
 
Overall, all the MFIs loan portfolios are growing with an average growth rate of 17% 
except the CREC of Méckhé which faced a decrease in its portfolio of about 47% 
over the four years. However this MFI still records the highest gross portfolio amount 
compared to the others.  
 
Nevertheless, the growth in portfolio is facing also a growth in portfolio at risk 180 
days for all the seven surveyed MFIs meaning some weaknesses in the loan portfolio 
management. 
 
In contrast to the PAR, some improvements are reported in operating expenses 
ratios which were roughly fewer than 20% except at the MEC of Dakar which mostly 
recorded OER over 40% in 2011 and at the MEC of Malicounda with about 90% in 
2009.  
 
As consequence, the OSS of the entire 07 MFIs was appreciable between 2008 and 
2010 (127%-148%) but dropped down to 88% in 2011 due to high operating 
expenses at the MECs of Tattaguine and Pékesse. 
 
The results also reveals that albeit claiming to be social oriented MFIs, the entire 
MFIs lack adequate tools, information and indicators to track and to prove that they 
are putting into practice their social mission, which often was not clearly stated. 
Based on the ECHOS© scale, it appears that the MFIs recorded low social 
performance in general (55%) but seemed to get better score in access and outreach 
and customers services, while social mission, human resources and social  
responsibility are lessened.  
 
 vi 
Regarding the governance, the score reveals some acceptable governance (62%) 
however with some differences between institutions. 
 
The results of linkages between financial performance, social performance and 
governance reveals no trade-off between financial and social performance, rather it 
reveals significant synergies between governance and social perform, and between 
OSS and human resources. 
 
All these results prove that rural microfinance institutions, rather rural microfinance 
network can be viable. It is just a matter of more governance, more discipline in 
procedure and more reportage of required information. 
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RESUME EXECUTIF 
Le but du présent mémoire est d’évaluer la viabilité du réseau FONGS FINRURAL, 
un réseau en construction de neuf mutuelles d’épargne et de crédit exerçant en 
milieu rural sénégalais. Il vise d’une part à apprécier la variabilité entre les différentes 
mutuelles du réseau en ce qui concerne la performance financière, la performance 
sociale et la gouvernance ; et d’autre part à apprécier la contribution de chaque 
mutuelle à l’atteinte des objectifs de viabilité du réseau. 
 
L’approche méthodologique a essentiellement consisté en d’une part l’exploitation 
des états financiers, des plans d’affaires, des rapports et procès verbaux ainsi que de 
tous documents jugés utiles pour notre étude ; et d’autre part en des visites de 
terrains au niveau des mutuelles à la base couplées d’entretien avec le personnel et 
les membres usagers. 
 
L’unité d’observation est constituée de 7 sur les 9 mutuelles affiliées au réseau faute 
de disponibilité des données et de fonctionnalité de deux mutuelles. 
 
Les données ont été collectées à l’aide de quatre outils principaux : le factsheet 
d’évaluation de la performance financière des institutions de microfinance élaboré 
conjointement par BRS et ADA, l’outil ECHOS© d’Incofin pour l’évaluation des 
performances sociales (version 2012), la grille de l’indice agrégé de gouvernance et 
les guides d’entretien élaborés spécifiquement au niveau de chaque mutuelle en 
fonction des différents résultats obtenus sur le plan des performances financière et 
sociale ainsi que sur le plan de la gouvernance. 
 
Les données financières ont été collectées sur les quatre dernières années (2008-
2011) alors que les données inhérentes à l’évaluation de la performance sociale et 
de la gouvernance présentent l’état actuel des mutuelles dans ces domaines. 
 
Différentes statistiques descriptives nous ont permis de faire des comparaisons. Le 
coefficient de corrélation de Spearman nous a permis d’apprécier les synergies et les 
compromissions qui peuvent exister entre les trois aspects de la viabilité. 
 
Il ressort de l’analyse entre les IMFs que le sociétariat essentiellement dominé par 
les femmes (50%) est en pleine croissance avec un croît moyen de 23% nettement 
supérieur au croît moyen de l’ensemble du pays (8.7%) dans le domaine avec 
toutefois quelques spécificités selon chaque mutuelle. 
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Dans le même ordre d’idée, il a été enregistré une augmentation de l’épargne 
mobilisée qui est toutefois concentrée au niveau de deux mutuelles (29%). Ces deux 
mutuelles détiennent à elles seules 54% de la totalité de l’épargne mobilisée par 
l’ensemble des mutuelles. Si pour la première mutuelle (la CREC de Méckhé) la 
situation est due à la forte implication des groupements sociétaires, tel n’est pas le 
cas au  niveau de la seconde mutuelle (MEC de Tattaguine) qui doit sa position à sa 
politique de mobilisation de l’épargne axée sur l’épargne nantie et l’épargne 
obligatoire de près de 33% comme condition indispensable pour l’accès au crédit. 
 
En ce qui concerne donc l’octroi du crédit, les principaux crédits octroyés sont des 
crédits de campagne et des crédits d’investissement à une seule échéance de 
remboursement, en dépit de la variabilité dans la durée des prêts. Ces crédits sont 
octroyés à partir de trois sources de financement : les dépôts ou épargnes des 
membres, les prêts et le capital social. La plupart des crédits sont octroyés à partir 
des dépôts entraînant ainsi une baisse de l’effet levier du fait de l’augmentation du 
capital. 
 
Dans tous les cas, on assiste à une forte croissance du portefeuille de crédit au 
niveau de l’ensemble des mutuelles avec un croît moyen de 17% l’an à l’exception 
de la CREC de Méckhé qui, tout en détenant le portefeuille de crédit le plus élevé, a 
subi une baisse de croissance de l’ordre de 47% sur  les quatre années écoulées. 
 
Cette croissance du portefeuille de crédit est malheureusement associée à une 
croissance du crédit en souffrance  après 180j. Ceci est observable au niveau de 
l’ensemble des mutuelles (avec toute fois quelque légères différences), conséquence 
des difficultés de gestion du crédit.  
 
A l’opposé du portefeuille en souffrance, des améliorations notables sont 
enregistrées au niveau du ratio des dépenses opérationnelles avec un taux 
globalement inférieur à 20% à l’exception d’une part de la mutuelle de Dakar qui a 
enregistré un ratio de 40% en 2011 et de la mutuelle de Malicounda avec un ratio de 
90% en 2009. 
 
Ainsi l’ensemble du réseau affiche une autosuffisance opérationnelle acceptable 
entre 2008 et 2010 (127%-148%) mais qui a néanmoins été affectée de façon 
négative (88%) par les dépenses opérationnelles des mutuelles de Pékesse et de 
Tattaguine en 2011. 
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Les résultats révèlent par ailleurs que malgré la revendication des mutuelles d’avoir 
des approches sociales, elles manquent d’outils adéquat, d’information et 
d’indicateurs pertinents pouvant permettre d’apprécier l’efficience de la mise en 
application de leur mission sociale qui d’ailleurs n’est pas souvent clairement définie. 
Les résultats obtenus à partir de l’outil ECHOS© affichent d’ailleurs que l’ensemble 
des mutuelles a une faible performance sociale (55%) même si certaines percées 
sont enregistrées au niveau de deux dimensions : l’accès et le taux de pénétration 
ainsi que les services aux membres.  
 
Sur le plan de la gouvernance, il ressort que les mutuelles présentent globalement 
une gouvernance appréciable (62%) avec néanmoins de grandes variations entre 
elles. 
 
Le test de corrélation de Spearman entre les trois dimensions montre l’absence de 
compromis entre la performance social, la gouvernance et la performance financière. 
Il révèle par contre des synergies significatives entre la gouvernance et la 
performance sociale d’une part et entre l’autosuffisance opérationnelle et les 
ressources humaines d’autre part.   
 
L’ensemble des résultats prouvent enfin que les institutions rurales de microfinance, 
mieux les réseaux ruraux de microfinance peuvent être viables. Il s’agit d’une 
question de gouvernance, de plus de discipline dans les procédures et de plus de 
capitalisation de l’ensemble des expériences en microfinance et ceci en relation avec 
les informations requises dans le secteur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Dedication ............................................................................................................................. i 
Foreword .............................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgments ...............................................................................................................iii 
EXECUTIVE SUMARY ..........................................................................................................iv 
RESUME EXECUTIF ...........................................................................................................vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SIGLES AND ACRONYMES ..................................................xii 
LISTE OF FIGURES AND TABLES .................................................................................... xiii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Problem statement ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Objectives .............................................................................................................................. 3 
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 4 
2.1 Review of literature .................................................................................................................... 4 
2.1.1 Main dimensions of viability: financial and social performance ................................... 4 
2.1.2 Other dimensions of viability analysis .............................................................................. 6 
2.2 Research questions .............................................................................................................. 8 
2.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................... 8 
2.3.1 Data collection ..................................................................................................................... 8 
2.3.2 Data analysis ....................................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY IN SENEGAL
 .............................................................................................................................................11 
3.1 A growth led by savings and credit unions ........................................................................... 11 
3.2 Rural areas are still under banked and underserved ......................................................... 12 
3.3 A strong legal and juridical framework .................................................................................. 13 
3.4 Leading networking initiatives ................................................................................................ 15 
3.5 Why networking? ...................................................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER FOUR: FONGS AND FONGS -FINRURAL ........................................................19 
4.1 From failures to new financial initiatives ............................................................................... 19 
4.2 The FAIR, the start up of the networking process .............................................................. 20 
4.3 Overview of FONGS FINRURAL ........................................................................................... 21 
4.3.1 Operating areas ................................................................................................................ 21 
 xi 
4.3.2 Membership ....................................................................................................................... 22 
4.3.3 Delivering flexible financial services .............................................................................. 23 
4.3.4 Sources of funding ............................................................................................................ 29 
CHAPTER FIVE: PERFORMANCES ANALYSES ...............................................................31 
5.1 Financial Analysis .................................................................................................................... 31 
5.1.1 Portfolio Management ...................................................................................................... 31 
5.1.2 Efficiency ............................................................................................................................ 34 
5.1.3 Profitability: Cost Ratio Analysis ..................................................................................... 36 
5.1.4 Sustainability ..................................................................................................................... 38 
5.2 Social performance Analysis .................................................................................................. 41 
5.3 Governance Analysis ............................................................................................................... 44 
5.4 Linking financial performance, social performance and governance in MFIs ................. 45 
5.6Toward sustainability: An endless fight.................................................................................. 47 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................49 
References ..........................................................................................................................51 
ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................54 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SIGLES AND ACRONYMES 
 
ACAPES : Association Culturelle d’Auto Promotion Educative et Sociale 
ADA : Appui au Développement Autonome 
AFD : Agence Française de Développement 
ARAF : Association Régionale des Agriculteurs de Fatick 
ASESCAW : Amicale Socio-économique Sportive et Culturelle des Agriculteurs du 
Walo  
BRS : Belgian Raiffeisen Foundation 
COPED : Coopérative des Groupements de Producteurs et Eleveurs du Delta 
COPI : Comité de Pilotage 
CPEC : Caisse Populaire d’Epargne et de Crédit 
CREC : Coopérative Rurale d’Epargne et de Crédit 
FONGS : Fédération des Organisations Non Gouvernementales du Sénégal 
FONGS 
FINRURAL 
: Réseau FONGS Finance Rurale 
GTZ : Deutsche Gesellshaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
MFI : Microfinance Institution 
Inter CREC  Réseau de Coopératives Rurales d’Epargne et de Crédit 
MEC : Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit 
MFR : Maisons Familiales Rurales 
MECSAPP : Mutuelle d’Epargne et de Crédit de la Solidarité pour l’Auto - Promotion  
Paysanne dans l’Arrondissement de Tattaguine 
SAPPATE : Solidarité pour l’Auto - Promotion  Paysanne dans l’Arrondissement de 
Tattaguine 
SOS FAIM : Development Belgium and Luxembourg Non Governmental 
Organization fighting against hunger and poverty in rural areas in Africa 
and in Latin America 
UGPM : Union des Groupements de Producteurs de Méckhé 
UGPN : Union des Groupements des Producteurs des Niayes  
UMOA : Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
LISTE OF FIGURES AND TABLES 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of MFIs' juridical forms 2005-2010 _________________________________________ 12 
Figure 2: Number of MFIs services points as of December 2010 ________________________________ 13 
Figure 3: Linkages, technical and financial flows between FONGS and FONGS FINRURAL ________ 20 
Figure 4: Membership as of December 2011 _________________________________________________ 22 
Figure 5: MFIs contribution to the network saving mobilization in 2011 ___________________________ 24 
Figure 6: Split of loan products in 4 MFIs in 2011 as % of the GLP ______________________________ 26 
Figure 7: Leverage (Debt/Equity) ____________________________________________________________ 29 
Figure 8: Portfolio At Risk over 180 days 2008-2011 __________________________________________ 32 
Figure 9: Operating Expenses Ratios 2009-2011______________________________________________ 34 
Figure 10: Portfolio yields 2009-2011 ________________________________________________________ 35 
Figure 11: Cost Ratios 2008-2011 ___________________________________________________________ 37 
Figure 12: Returns on Assets 2009-2011_____________________________________________________ 38 
Figure 13: Operational Self Sufficiency 2008-2011 ____________________________________________ 40 
Figure 14: Breakdown of portfolio yield 2011 _________________________________________________ 41 
Figure 15: Social Performances of the Seven MFIs ____________________________________________ 42 
Figure 16: Social performance of FONGS FINRURAL _________________________________________ 43 
Figure 17: Aggregated Index of Governance _________________________________________________ 44 
 
 
Table 1: Correlations between OSS, Social Performance Indicators and Aggregated Index of 
Governance................................................................................................................................... .....46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem statement  
 
For the last two decades, the (West) African Region has been experiencing a drastic 
growth in the microfinance industry (Périlleux, 2010). This growth is mainly 
characterized not  only by the creation of numerous and various microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) from savings and credit groups to non-bank microfinance 
institutions, but also by a tremendous growth in term of beneficiaries (Lafourcade, 
Isern, Mwangi & Brown, 2005; Labie & Périlleux, 2008).  
 
Whereas some of these MFIs are registered and even licensed, many others still 
operate informally, leading to serious deficiencies and crises in the industry. One of 
the most recent cases is that of ICC-Services1 and kinds in Bénin where more than 
161 billion CFA were unfortunately robbed from public depositors (BAfD, OCDE, 
PNUD and CEA, 2011). In order to avoid such problems, the UMOA (Union 
Monétaire Ouest Africaine)2, a West African monetary institution, had previously 
refined the legal environment of the Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés (SFD)3 by 
reviewing the PARMEC4 law in April 2007. 
 
The Republic of Senegal was the second country of UEMOA that adopted the new 
law in 2008 with the appellation of law 2008-47. 
 
One innovation in the new law is the withdrawal of Savings and Credit Groups and 
the necessity for basic mutuals and cooperatives to federate into unions or networks. 
The basic idea was to improve the microfinance industry management and make a 
better follow up of the MFIs. Secondly, it aimed at improving the implementation of 
good practices among MFIs, thus helping them to perform both socially and 
financially.   
 
FONGS, a farmers’ organization in Senegal decided to set up a savings and credit 
unions network for its members in order to facilitate their access to financial services. 
Those savings and credit mutuals, have started with the process to get in line with 
                                                          
1 Investment Consultancy and Computering  
2 West African Monetary Union 
3  In West African countries belonging to the UEMOA, are called “Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés” or “Decentralized 
Financial Systems” all the institutions that aim at providing financial services to people who don’t usually have access to bank 
and others regulated financial institutions. 
4 Programme d’Appui à l’Application de la Réglementation des Mutuelles d’Epargne et de Crédit. 
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the new regulation. However, the network is not regulated yet. With regard to all the 
problems savings and credit unions or mutuals are facing particularly in Western 
Africa, it seems very important, before going further in the licensing process, to 
assess whether those mutuals are currently viable.  
 
The viability issue appears important in the microfinance industry since MFIs need 
financial resources to continuously and sustainably provide financial services to their 
clients or members. To come up with this situation, MFIs use various strategies to 
sustain their financial resources through the minimization of operating expenses, a 
better financial management and good administration (Ben Soltane, 2012).  As these 
strategies are not sufficient, MFIs need to intermediate additional resources from 
commercial banks, they also need assistance from donors. However, with the global 
financial crisis, international funds are becoming scarce and difficult to capture. 
Thereafter the rational becomes that financial support should be granted to MFIs 
holding the expected capacity of absorption and implementing governance and 
management mechanisms (Hudon, 2007). Therefore, MFIs have the challenge to 
build confidence and trust to attain their own financial sustainability, and design 
adapted financial mechanics to attract funds, helping them to realize economies of 
scale (Ben Soltane, 2012). These confidence and trust might be built if MFIs are 
viable, socially and economically.  
 
The present thesis which is the result of the research effectuated in the framework of 
our complementary master in microfinance endeavours to give some insights about 
that viability issue especially within a rural microfinance network. 
 
In this first chapter we raised up the viability issue of MFIs involved in a networking 
process regarding the new legal requirements within UMOA region and objectives of 
the study as well. 
 
In the second chapter we presented through a literature review an overview of the 
current mainstreams regarding financial and social performance of MFIs, the 
synergies and trade-offs highlighted by scholars and practicians. Likewise, we 
presented both the research questions and the methodology approach used. 
 
The third chapter depicted the microfinance industry in Senegal, the new regulation 
and networking dynamics. 
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The chapter four pinpointed the FONGS FINRURAL network as the main object of 
the study pertaining to operations’ areas, membership along with financial products 
delivery and funding structure. 
 
In the chapter five we deepened our study on the performance analysis. First we 
strived to assess the financial performance through four main dimensions. Secondly 
we discussed about the social performance and the governance issue. We tried also 
to build a link between financial performance, social performance and governance. 
Then we made a global analysis about all the results obtained. 
 
In the chapter six we made a global synthesis of the research, the main lessons 
learned and the challenges for future. 
1.2 Objectives  
The ultimate objective of this research is to assess the viability of FONGS FINRURAL 
network. More specifically, this research aims at:   
- Assessing the financial and social performance of FONGS FINRURAL 
network and its affiliated associations; 
- Assessing the governance of the associations affiliated to the network as well 
as of the network. 
At the end of this study, FONGS FINRURAL and its partners are aware of the 
performance of the network as well as its strengths and weaknesses. Thus, relevant 
decisions for a better sustainability can be taken and implemented. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF LITERATURE, 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Review of literature 
Throughout this section, we provide conceptual explanation of key terms used for a 
better apprehension of the thesis. The section is divided in two parts: the foremost 
focuses on the main dimensions of viability, the second focuses on social viability 
and governance. 
 
2.1.1 Main dimensions of viability: financial and social performance 
2.1.1.1 Financial performance 
Financial performance is commonly defined as the measure of efficient utilization of 
assets by a company to create revenue. It can be also viewed as a general appraisal 
of a company’s financial statement over time, and accordingly can help analyze 
identical companies inside the same industry or compare aggregated industries or 
sectors5. Though there are many financial indicators in finance sector many 
practitioners and scholars (Mersland, Randoy & Strom, 2010; Kumar, 2011) usually 
focus on Return on Assets and Return on Equity. 
 
Mersland, Randøy & Strøm (2010) used indicators such as Return on Assets (ROA), 
Operational Self-Sufficiency (OSS) and Financial Self-Sufficiency (FSS) to assess 
the financial performance of microbanks. They found that most of the microbanks in 
their survey were not financially self sufficient even though they could meet their 
obligations.  
 
Nevertheless, while in bank sector the financial performance is usually measured 
through the ratios above mentioned, the trend in microfinance is to include on top of 
them others indicators enabling a better understanding of the specificities in this 
industry. These indicators include the interest rate, the arrears or the repayment rate, 
the level of activities, the aptitude to collect savings, the financial and operational 
costs, the level of client oriented priority, the expansion costs etc (ACDI, 1999 quoted 
by Diao, 2006).  
 
                                                          
5
 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/financialperformance.asp#ixzz1qy3HGaL3  
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Moreover, BRS6 and ADA7 used the financial performance indicators proposed by 
von Stauffenberg, Janson, Kenyon & Barluenga-Badiola (2003) and Barres et al. 
(2006) to elaborate a factsheet helping at assessing MFIs’ financial performance.  
The latter seems relevant for out study.  
2.1.1.2 Social performance 
 Social performance is widely perceived as the effects of an organization on the 
social life of its clients. It refers to the internal relations between an institution, its 
employees and others stakeholders with whom it interacts (Lapenu, Zeller, Grelley, 
Chao-Béroff & Verhagen, 2004). On the other hand, social performance refers to the 
effective application of the social mission of an organization (Dewez & Neisa, 2009; 
IFAD8, 2006). In microfinance, social objectives usually include the bread and the 
depth of outreach, the adequacy of the services to the needs of clients as well as the 
quality of those services, the outcome for the clients and their social networks, the 
commitment of the MFI vis-à-vis its staff, its clients and its environment (IFAD, 2006). 
 
Mersland, Randøy & Strøm (2010) used the outreach with three criteria as a proxy to 
social performance or mission: the outreach to the poorest, the outreach to women, 
and the outreach to rural areas.  
 
However, for IFAD (2006), social performance is not only limited to the measurement 
of objectives and outcome. Social performance is also concerned with actions and 
measures used by an MFI to obtain those results. Basically, social performance is 
about how well MFIs give themselves the means for their social mission. The aim is 
to determine whether the MFI gives itself the means to reach its social goals by 
tracking improvement towards the latter and understanding how to use the 
information to make improvements in its operations.  
 
Many tools  exist in  the industry for a better understanding of social impact among 
which the Social action developed by Accion International, the ECHOS© designed by 
Incofin, The Social scoring tools presented by specialised microfinance institution, 
and the Social Performance Indicator developed by Cerise (Dewez & Neisa, 2009). 
 
                                                          
6
 Belgian Raiffeisen Foundation 
7
 Appui au Développement Autonome 
8
 International Fund for Agricultural Development 
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Nevertheless, regardless the tool, there is a widespread understanding on the main 
dimensions a social performance analysis should tackle while assessing a MFI. 
These dimensions are: target and outreach, adequacy of products delivering and 
services, client participation and the social responsibility of the MFI. We will focus on 
those dimensions in our study. 
2.1.1.3 Financial and social performance: synergies or trade-off? 
According to many authors and practitioners, MFIs always face a situation of mission 
drift (Dewez & Neisa, 2009; Conning & Morduch, 2011; Ben Soltane, 2012) since 
reaching the double bottom line in microfinance is quite a paradox.  Nevertheless, the 
research findings about that specific aspect are quite various. Whereas some authors 
have shown that there is a real trade-off between achieving financial and social 
performance in microfinance (Hermes, Lensink & Meesters, 2011), others such as 
Zerai & Rani (2012) and Ben Soltane (2012) have found that there is neutral 
relationship between financial and social performance; rather, they have deducted 
that it is possible for a MFI to achieve both financial and social performance.  
 
But for Gonzalez (2010), the situation of trade-off or synergy depends essentially on 
the selected indicators or variables.   
 
Our study will contribute to the improvement of this issue which is currently riveting 
the industry. 
2.1.2 Other dimensions of viability analysis 
Another current mainstream in the microfinance industry is that MFIs should be 
sustainable while providing their services. For long time, institutionalisation was seen 
as the main factor of sustainability and was focused only on financial and institutional 
viability (GTZ, 2002). However there is a growing acknowledgment that financial 
performance only cannot help MFIs to reach their missions (Pistelli, Simanowitz & 
Thiel, 2011). Thus, social viability and governance appear as two other dimensions 
that should be included for a better apprehension of the concept of sustainability 
(GTZ, 2002).   
2.1.2.1 Social viability 
For GTZ (2002), social viability can be seen as the completion of a win-win trade-off 
on interest between different stakeholders having a direct or indirect interest or link 
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with the MFI. It is therefore a key concept which, once well integrated may impact on 
the good functioning of MFIs. 
GTZ (2002) identified two types of social viability: 
- The internal social viability which focuses on the trade-off relationship between 
actors directly linked to the MFI; 
- The external social viability which includes the mainstreaming of the MFI in 
local environment. 
In general, practitioners and scholars focus mainly on the internal social viability 
though the external one is quite important.  
2.1.2.2 Governance 
Progressively used in the microfinance industry, the notion of governance is most 
often related to the functional relations between the management board and loan 
officers who are daily involved in all the management process of a given microfinance 
institution (GTZ, 2002; Lapenu & Pierret, 2006).  Basically it refers to the processes 
whereby equity holders and others financing agencies ascertain themselves that the 
use of their funds by the institution is in line with the objectives they are dedicated to 
(Hartarska, 2005; Labie & Périlleux, 2008). More widely, governance may also be 
concerned with many others issues in MFIs such as strategic objectives (clients 
targeting, product design, organisational structure), resources allocation and 
management, adaptation to the changes in the sector, crisis prevention and 
management (GTZ, 2002; Lapenu & Pierret, 2006). 
 
The good governance is a key element for MFIs sustainability as the quality of 
governance affects the vision and strategy of MFIs regardless their status (AFD, 
2008). Moreover, for Mersland (2009), corporate governance affects the way 
institutions perform. Particularly in cooperatives structures, corporate governance 
tends to be more complex.  Labie & Périlleux (2008), through a relevant literature, 
emphasised the moral hazard, conflicts between owner and manager, conflicts 
between members and elected board of directors, conflicts between employees and 
volunteers as four main conflicts encountered in credit unions’ governance. 
 
Therefore, the governance analysis appears as one key component for assessing the 
viability of a MFI. 
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Mersland & Storm (2009) highlighted three dimensions to look at whilst analysing the 
governance in a MFI: the “vertical dimension” focused on the owners and the staff, 
the “horizontal dimension” between the MFI and its clients and the “external 
governance dimension”.   
 
On the other hand, based on IMF (2004) and Briceno-Garmendia & Foster (2007), 
Wele (2009) proposed six variables with nine indicators to assess the quality of 
governance in microfinance institutions. These variables are: Respect of regulation, 
Managerial autonomy, Quality of the information system, Power of board of Directors. 
He combined the analysis of theses indicator with the analysis of the board structure 
and efficiency as proposed by Mersland & Storm (2009). 
 
2.2 Research questions 
The present thesis will address three fundamental questions: 
- How do financial performance, social performance and governance vary 
among FONGS FINRURAL affiliated associations? 
- How do the different performances of the affiliated associations of FONGS 
FINRURAL affect the viability of the network?  
- To what extent are linked financial performance, social performance and 
governance in the surveyed MFIs? 
2.3 Methodology 
Our methodology consisted essentially in: 
- The use of internal documents such as minutes from board meetings, 
business plan, manual of procedures, other secondary sources data;  
- The use of data bases and annual reports when they exist, financial reports, 
audited financial statements etc; 
- Visits at basic associations and clients information. 
- Observations  
All these actions were carried out in the framework of the internship effectuated 
within the FONGS from May to August 2012.  
2.3.1 Data collection 
Quantitative and qualitative data were collected at 07 affiliated MFIs and at the 
FONGS headquarters level as well.  
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Quantitative data were collected by using the financial factsheets components, the 
ECHOS© tool for social performance data and the grid for assessing the quality of 
governance.  
 
Observation, Semi-structured and unstructured interviews were used to collect 
qualitative data from main stakeholders of the MFIs. 
 
Secondary data were collected through reports and existing literature. 
2.3.2 Data analysis 
The analysis of data was an integrated analysis of three keys elements of viability 
that are financial viability, socioeconomic viability and institutional viability. These 
three elements are respectively assessed through financial performance, social 
performance and governance analyses.  
 
The financial performance has been assessed with the financial assessment 
factsheet9.  Four categories of fourteen indicators were analysed: the portfolio quality, 
the efficiency and productivity, the financial management and the profitability. 
 
The social performance has been assessed with the ECHOS© Tool of Incofin. 
ECHOS© is Incofin Investment Management’s in-house social performance 
evaluation tool. The version used was the 2012 one, which takes into account the 
most recent developments on social performance in the microfinance industry. It 
focuses on five dimensions:  social mission, Outreach and Access, Customers 
services, Human resources, Environmental and social practices. 
 
The quality of governance of the basic organizations as well as of the network has 
been assessed with the Aggregated Index of Governance. The rational is that this 
index not only combines different aspects of governance but also can be more easily 
because using particularly binary variables (Wele, 2009). It focuses on six variables: 
the respect of the regulation, the management autonomy, the information system 
quality, the board of directors. Some variables from the analysis framework of 
Charreaux (1996) have been transformed in binary variables and included in the 
Aggregate Index of Governance: direct control by shareholders, existence of internal 
and legal audit, existence of salaries bonuses and the financial intermediation. 
                                                          
9
 Can be downloaded from www.microfact.org  
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For a better understanding of the drivers behind the disparity between associations 
and the network, we used descriptive analysis mainly based on frequency and mean. 
We used spearman coefficient of correlation to appreciate the linkages between 
financial performance, social performance and governance index in our analysis unit. 
This latter comprised 7 of the 9 MFIs affiliated to the network due mainly to the data 
availability and to the non-functioning of the two others the last two years. Besides, 
as the network as a whole is not yet fully involved in the financial intermediation, the 
effect of these missed MFIs on the network can be minimized.  
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CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND OF THE 
MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY IN SENEGAL 
3.1 A growth led by savings and credit unions 
The microfinance industry in Senegal is a growing sector marked by the prominence 
of numerous MFIS, NBFIs and Savings and Credits Cooperatives or Mutuals. Three 
wide periods determine the microfinance growth in Senegal (Fall, 2012):   
 
 The First period was characterized by the financial crisis of eighties along with 
the creation of the first credit and savings institutions. During that period, a 
temporary framework related to the conditions of organizing, licensing and 
functioning of Savings and Credit Mutuals (decree n° 1702 of 23-02-1993) was 
set up and admitted 120 MFIs to be licensed. However no disposition of that 
law addressed the regulation issue of the “Groupements d’Epagrne et de 
Crédit (GEC)”10. 
 
 The second period (1993-2003) was marked by the enforcement of the legal 
framework on Decentralized Financial Systems (so called PARMEC law). That 
period was mainly influenced by the growth of the industry and the creation of 
MFIs’ networks such as Unions, Federations, and Confederations which 
appeared as apex or umbrella institutions. 
 
 The Third period (2003-nowadays) is mainly dominated by the 
commercialization and the professionalization of the industry. During that 
period, MFIs are more focused on risks management issues and the 
reinforcement of the supervision of the industry. Especially, one observes a 
professional management of institutions, an effective control of network staff, 
and a focus on a good financial and institutional equilibrium.11 
 
As of December 2010, the microfinance industry in Senegal was composed as 
depicted in the figure 1. 
                                                          
10
 The GEC (Savings and Credit Groups) are basic or primary associations which are not regulated as basic financial institution 
but operate based on the single authorization of the Finances Ministry. 
11
 See http://www.microfinance.sn/page-250-1.html  
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Figure 1: Evolution of MFIs' juridical forms 2005-2010 
 
Source:  Built from MEF/DRSSFD (2010, p.2)  
 
It appears through the figure 1 that savings and credit groups which dominated the 
industry between 2005 and 2007 recorded a decrease since 2007 due to the new 
regulation. Concurrently one witnesses the growth of isolated savings and credit 
cooperatives and mutuals as well as MFIs’ networks. On the other hand, commercial 
non bank microfinance institutions are entering the sector whereas under convention 
non bank financial institutions are dropping out. Nonetheless, the industry is still 
dominated by the savings and credits unions which provide the essential in 
microfinance services. For example the seven most renowned savings and credit 
unions networks of Senegal network concentrate about 70% of the clients/members, 
88% of deposits and 82% of outstanding loan portfolio of the industry since 2005 
onwards (Daouda, 2006 quoted by SOS FAIM, 2007).  
3.2 Rural areas are still under banked and underserved  
As of December 2010 the number of services points of MFIs was 976 with an 
individual outreach of 12% (MEF/DRSSFD, 2010)  representing more than 21% of 
services points, 24% of loan portfolio and 22% of deposits of the total finance sector 
(Diao, 2006). 
 
Despite the increase in number of MFIs in the number of clients, the microfinance in 
Senegal is still more urban and sub-urban than rural. The figure 2 shows the 
geographical outreach of microfinance industry in 2010. 
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Figure 2: Number of MFIs services points as of December 2010 
 
Source: MEF/DRSSFD (2010, p.3) 
 
The figure 2 reveals that more than 70 % of the MFIs operating in Senegal and their 
branches are located exclusively in urban areas including Dakar, Thiès and someway 
Kaolack, Fatick, Sedhiou and Saint Louis. As consequence, poor people living in 
rural and remote areas remain still unbanked. The other 30% MFIs, most often 
created from farmers and rural development organizations, are struggling to reduce 
the gap, allowing poor people having access to finance even with tiny amount of 
credit. 
3.3 A strong legal and juridical framework 
The microfinance legal environment has evolved over the time in West Africa Region 
Countries especially in those belonging to the West African Monetary Union. 
 
The first initiative of implementing a strong institutional framework for the 
microfinance in Senegal has been observed with the “Projet d’Assistance Technique 
aux Operations Bancaires Mutualistes au Sénégal” (ATOMBS). The project was 
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carried by the Canadian Cooperation and aimed at creating adequate conditions for 
the development of the mutualist banking network. In 1992, the “Cellule AT/CPEC12” 
in charge of organizing the conditions of functioning and licensing of mutualist 
institutions continued the project.  
 
The juridical and institutional framework was effective in 1995 after the adoption of 
the PARMEC Law and its enforcement decree (decree n°097-1106 of 11 November 
1997) sustained by the BCEAO instruction on 10 march 1998. The PARMEC law 
aimed at designing and promoting the extension of a juridical environment specifically 
devoted to the microfinance in UMOA context.  
 
Another project PASMEC (Projet d’Appui aux Strutures Mutualistes et Coopératives 
d’Epargne et de Crédit) was set up to promote the development of microfinance 
practice in UMOA as well as the financing of small and medium enterprises (SME) 
and handcraft. The operation permitted the devising of guidelines for the 
microfinance industry strongly based on the success stories of microfinance practices 
around the world (Diao, 2006). 
 
However, important weaknesses were observed in the legal framework of UMOA 
MFIs.  
 The PARMEC law emphasised the development of MFIs with cooperative 
models, restricting thus the development of other models of MFIs such as 
limited companies in their various forms. That situation hampered innovations 
in the industry and accordingly the diversity of financial services for the poor 
(Fall, 2012); 
 The short term authorization given to non Bank Financial Institutions other 
than Cooperatives and Mutuals undermined investment in the industry as well 
as access to financial markets and long term commercial borrowings; 
 The OHADA agreement on the guarantee and tangible collaterals and the 
recovery policies didn’t fit with microfinance industry realities; 
 The transformation of NGO MFIs to regulated MFIs was undermined by the 
law of 1901 on associations. 
 The contents of the law on usury didn’t include MFIs’ realities thus hindering 
their viability. 
                                                          
12
 Assistance Technique aux Caisses Populaires d'Epargne et de Crédit : Technical Assistance to Savings and Credit 
People Banks. 
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 The prudential ratios were not standardized for NBFI and comparisons in the 
industry appeared difficult (Azocli & Adjibi, 2007). 
 
The new regulation on Decentralized Financial Systems was adopted by Senegal 
Government on 03 September 2008 through the Law 2008-47. The main changes or 
initiatives in the new regulation are as follows: 
 The origination of a single  policy for the regulation of MFIs involving the 
removal of the savings and credit group and of the structures under 
convention as well 
 The  assent of the BCEAO in the issuance of the license 
 The intervention of the BCEAO and the Banking Commission in the 
supervision of institutions having reached a certain level of growth 
 The strengthening of the prudential norms and the penalties, 
 The mandatory certification of accounts of MFIs of a certain size 
 The compulsory membership within the Professional Association of MFIs 
Practitioners 
 The alternative of creating Limited MFI Companies 
 The implementation of a new accounting standards for MFIs (Fall, 2012, 
p.38)13 
 
Its application decree (n° 2008-1366 of 28 November 2008) and other BCEAO 
instructions designed strong framework to supervise the industry and avoid drifts. In 
addition, the regulation’s new requirements and devised prudential ratios compel 
MFIs to become viable (financially mainly), to network or to disappear.  
3.4 Leading networking initiatives  
As of December 2011, about twenty microfinance institutions networks exist in 
Senegal. Among these, only thirteen are regulated. Nevertheless, depending on their 
implementation process and regardless they licensing status, they can be classified 
in two main categories (SOS-FAIM, 2007):  
- The first category is related to networks that have been devised and 
implemented based on a top-down approach. The creation of new branches is 
done in the network expansion perspective and those networks are supported 
or have been supported by international donors, NGOs, public organisms of 
                                                          
13 See also http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.52111/New_Microfinance_Law_WAEMU.pdf accessed on 09.07.2012 
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international cooperation. Belonging to that category, we can name the Credit 
Mutuel du Sénégal (CMS), the Alliance de Credit et d’Epargne pour la 
Production (ACEP), and the UM-PAMECAS14. These three networks started 
their activities as development projects supported and financed by 
international donors and appear nowadays as the most important stakeholders 
of the microfinance industry in Senegal. Most of these networks were set up in 
1997. 
 
- The second category is related to networks that have been set up based on 
existing MFIs and Village Banks. MFIs created from local development 
associations initiatives decided to cooperate and to federate in unions in order 
to improve their efficiency and viability. As the MFIs were different at the 
beginning, they need to standardise their procedures and products. Two main 
subcategories belong to that group depending of the origin of the networking. 
 The networking initiative may be exclusively endogenous as well as the 
process of implementation. It is the case of the Inter-Crec Network with 
17 savings and credit unions operating in Basse-Casamance in 
Southern Senegal. 
 The networking initiative may be partially exogenous and supported by 
international partners. This is the case of the initiative of creating a 
network in Louga Region with the support of two international NGOs: 
Aquadev (from Belgium) and CISV (from Italy). The initiative is funded 
by the European Commission. This is also the case of FONGS 
FINRURAL Network, which is a joint initiative of the Fédération des 
Organisations Non Gouvernementales du Sénégal (FONGS) and its 
partner SOS-FAIM (Belgium and Luxembourg) 
3.5 Why networking? 
Even if the new law promotes the networking of individual MFIs, the process is not an 
easy task as networking implies many challenges and transformations within the 
MFIs. SOS-FAIM (2007) emphasised five main advantages in networking savings 
and credit unions: 
 The first advantage underlined is a better liquidity management. Due to the 
principle of mutualisation, the surplus of cash in some MFIs might be used by 
                                                          
14
 Union des Mutuelles du Partenariat pour la Mobilisation de l'Epargne et du Crédit au Sénégal 
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others MFIs in need of more cash to face their portfolio growth. The network 
then operates like a central bank in gathering the cash surplus and in 
redistributing it to MFIs equitably (fairly, evenhandedly). As MFIs do not 
usually have the same cash flow cycle, the network management can help at 
smoothing the cash flows fluctuation between affiliated institutions. In addition, 
the network could better manage the liquidity through financial investments as 
it can access to financial markets. 
 
 The second advantage is the access to external funds such as commercial 
markets, international donors and Microfinance Investment Vehicles Funds. 
The individual MFIs do not always have a good accounting system and 
accordingly lack of support from banks, donors and NGOs. Yet, the access to 
external lines of credit can be useful in long term for MFIs for a better 
management of their short and long term liabilities.  
 
 The networking helps in scaling economies by reducing the cost of a MIS15 for 
exemple, the staff training cost, the hiring of experts etc... 
 
 By networking, MFIs offer themselves opportunities and framework for sharing 
experiences, goods practices, and information. Moreover, the network 
operates as a Central for Risk Management, thus avoiding multiple borrowings 
to clients and over- indebtedness through a good credit bureau between 
affiliated MFIs.  
 
 The network can also reinforce internal and external controls, from staff of the 
network headquarters, the hiring of auding experts, on top of the Supervisin of 
the Central Bank. 
 
However,  the same author raised up some drawbacks:  
 The partial loss of independence and autonomy of affiliated organizations. 
Due to the standards and the requirement of the network, an affiliated MFI 
might  be obliged to transfet part of its comptences to the network (liquidity 
management for example). 
                                                          
15
 Management Information System 
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 The presence of the network can threaten the membership inside MFIs and 
induce a loss of members control on MFIs  especially when more professional 
staff members should be hired by the network.   
 
 It becomes mandatory for the network to standardizes the management 
procedures, the credit policies, the management tools, and data collections. 
  
 The mutualisation of cash surplus seems to be a key condition for the 
networking. Affiliated MFIs are therefore jointly financially liable and have to 
share the same vision in oder to improve synergies between basic units and 
the social cohesion inside the network (SOS-FAIM, 2007). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FONGS AND FONGS -FINRURAL 
 
4.1 From failures to new financial initiatives 
The “Fédération des Organisations Non Gouvernementale du Sénégal” (FONGS) is a 
rural households apex association originated in 1976 and licensed in 1978. It aims at 
restoring the farmers’ status through the accountability and the empowerment in 
solidarity in order to address different challenges of rural areas. It is composed of 
more than 150000 members split in 31 affiliated associations throughout different 
regions of the country (Périlleux, 2011; Ndiaye, 2012) 
 
The FONGS initiative is performed through two main axes:  
- The political axis which is involved in the farmers’ welfare advocacy by 
fostering social and technical intercourse amongst affiliated organizations and 
by lobbying.  
- The economic axis is related to the capacities building of rural households, the 
strengthening of agricultural management, the betterment of local financial 
systems, and the enhancement of agricultural products added values 
(FONGS, internal document).  
 
To attain the economic axis, a number of initiatives have been performed from 1984 
to 1992 through financial operations, credit backing to affiliated associations, 
agricultural commodities exchanges programmes, etc. Unfortunately, many of those 
initiatives were abortive due to four main reasons: 
- Targeting failures: Credits were catered for people who could not repay and 
unremarkably defaulted.  
- Lack of efficient means and procedures for the scrutiny of funded activities; 
- Mismatches between projects submitted by associations’ leaders and the reel 
needs of members; 
- Mission drift in the allotment of the financial resources incurred from donors 
and partners (FONGS FINRURAL, 2011) 
 
It has appeared that the FONGS’ mission was not to directly cater financial services 
for its affiliated development associations; which have therefore been supported to 
launch self-managed and free savings and credit unions to face up financial needs of 
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their members. Thenceforth, the mutuals were set up as twin associations of mother 
associations of which they were perceived as the main financing tool.  
4.2 The FAIR, the start up of the networking process 
One major project carried out by the FONGS remains the Facilité d’Appui aux 
Inititaives Rurales funded by Luxembourg government through the NGO SOS FAIM 
(Belgium and Luxembourg). This initiative was conceived as a response to 
miscellaneous unmet financial investment needs of rural households.  
 
With a global cost of about 514 millions CFA, one part of the fund assists household 
investment needs through long term investment loans (325 millions CFA). The 
second part of the fund (190 millions) helps at subsidising technical assistance to 15 
MFIs through which investment loans are provided to rural households in accordance 
with FONGS affiliated associations. 
 
Started since 2007 the project endeavoured at experiencing the rural investment 
through new financing models: no collateral, low interest rates, flexible long term 
repayment schedules, etc... After five rounds of the project through which about 353 
millions CFA were disbursed to found 257 projects it appeared important to 
strengthen MFIs involved in the project by networking them (Ndiaye, 2012). 
 
The figure 3 below illustrates the links between surveyed MFIs and farmers’ 
organizations affiliated to FONGS: 
 
Figure 3: Linkages, technical and financial flows between FONGS and FONGS FINRURAL 
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A foremost analysis on this framework shows up that financial needs of rural 
households should first be reported to their development associations which will 
transfer the information to the upper levels of FONGS. Thenceforth, the finance 
network will base both on its financial assets and on the FONGS vision to devise and 
provide required loan products to rural households accordingly.  
 
The main concern of this process is to preclude a mismanagement of FONGS and its 
partners’ funds directed to financial needs of rural households, thereafter help 
improving rural households’ financial access. Besides, strong links could be 
sustained between the finance network and FONGS and permit credit policies and 
strategic orientations of mutuals to unceasingly meet with FONGS vision and needs 
of farmers organizations, unheeding the growing competition in the industry.  
4.3 Overview of FONGS FINRURAL 
4.3.1 Operating areas 
The FONGS FINRURAL network comprises 09 MFIs performing in 3 of the 7 agro-
ecologic regions of Senegal: the “peanut basin”, the “valleys”, and the “Niayes” 
renowned as important rural and agricultural areas aside from the southern of the 
country, and constituting about 30% of the surface of Senegal. These MFIs are the 
following: MEC MFR of Malicounda, MEC SAPP of Tattaguine, MEC ARAF of 
Gossas, MEC MFR of Pékésse, CREC UGPM of Méckhé, MEC UGPN of Darou 
Koudoss, MEC FAM of Dakar, MEC COPED of Ross Béthio and MEC Koyli Winrdé 
of Podor. 
 
The remaining part of this paper will focus only on seven MFIs owing to  the inactivity 
of the MEC ARAF of Gossass and COPED of Ross Béthio the past two years (2010 
and 2011) for governance concerns. Likewise, the data’s nonentity of the two MFIs 
hindered their inclusion in analyses.  
 
All the other seven MFIs involved in the networking process recorded diversity of 
experiences pertaining to their operating areas. The average experience in the 
industry is about eight years, the MFI of Dakar appearing as the eldest MFI while the 
MFI of Malicounda is at its early stage of development. The experiences recorded by 
the MFIs (minimum of 4 years) are important to have some insight about their 
performances and how they can affect the viability of the network. 
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4.3.2 Membership 
The figure 4 illustrates the membership situation of the MFIs as of December 2011. 
 
Figure 4: Membership as of December 2011 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
It appears through the figure 4 that the Network affiliated MFIs can be assorted in 
three wide groups while considering the accession number: those who hold more 
than 1000 members (43%), those with membership between 500 and 1000 (43%) 
and the small MFIs comprising less than 500 members (14%). 
 
The MEC SAPP of Tattaguine, the MEC FAM of Dakar and the MEC Koyli Winrdé of 
Podor hold the highest membership levels (1253, 1232 and 1178 members 
respectively) subsequent to their seniority in the field combined with their targeting 
strategies.  Indeed, MEC SAPP and MEC FAM are the only ones holding other 
periodic branch aside from their headquarters.  
 
The MEC MFR of Malicounda shows up the lowest membership (326) due likely to its 
youth in the industry given that it is the only one MFI with headquarters in 
Malicounda. Nevertheless, the propinquity of the MEC with other MFIs in Mbour 
might also induce a low membership record since the other MFIs are developing new 
targeting strategies such as mobile services points.  
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The membership levels recorded at the MEC UGPN of Daroukoudoss, the CREC of 
Méckhé and the MEC MFR of Pékesse pinpoint their anchorage within their 
communities and the willingness of their mother associations to assist them.  
 
On the other hand, three main categories of members are identified: Women, Men 
and Groups or development associations. In general, the membership is dominated 
by women (representing 50% of members) followed by men (42%) and groups (8%). 
This finding reasserts Armendariz (2011) who argues that women usually constitute 
the main clients/members of MFIs. 
 
Nevertheless, this trend presents specificities. For example at Malicounda, 
Daroukoudoss and Meckhé, men are the most likely (with 49% and 64 % of 
membership respectively) albeit with tiny differences.  In contrast, MEC FAM 
members are more likely women (76%) because the first women-oriented approach 
at the beginning.  
 
It seems interesting to notice that overall, the membership is growing over time. For 
the entire seven MFIs, the growth rate in 2010 was about 23% which is sharply 
higher than the average of the country (8.7%) for the same period (MEF/DRSSFD, 
2010). Nevertheless, the trend decreases in 2011 with 3% of growth mainly owed to 
the decrease in membership at the MECs of Daroukoudoss and Koyli Winrdé and at 
the CREC of Méckhé. Three main reasons might explain this decrease: the 
competition in Mboro region (for the MEC of Daroukoudoss), the sanitazing of the 
accounting of the CREC of Méckhé, and the temporary cease of the FAIR in 2010.   
4.3.3 Delivering flexible financial services  
4.3.3.1 Savings 
Notwithstanding the widespread understanding that poor people especially living in 
rural and remote areas do save in different ways (Mersland & Eggen, 2007), there is 
nowadays increasing evidence that monetary savings in banks or MFIs are growing 
tremendously.  
 
The figure 5 depicts the contribution of each MFI in savings mobilization in 2011. 
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Figure 5: MFIs contribution to the network saving mobilization in 2011 
 
      Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
It appears from the figure 5 that in 2011, the CREC UGPM of Méckhé and the MEC 
SAPP of Tattaguine contributed both for about 54% of the network savings meaning 
an uneven ability of savings mobilization amongst the seven MFIs. 
 
Besides, the savings growth rate recorded by the seven MFIs in the last three years 
is about 14.5% with some variations between MFIs. 
 
The increasing savings at the MEC SAPP (annual average growth of 18%) is 
peculiarly vindicated by its targeting strategy based on periodic service points and the 
mandatory savings’ requirements before loans granting (33% of the loan).  
 
In contrast, despite the high annual average savings growth at the MEC MFR of 
Malicounda of about 29%, its contribution to the entire MFIs is about only 2% in 2011. 
This situation can be explained not only by the malfunctioning of its mother-
association, but also by the difficulties of the MFI to meet its members’ financial 
needs. For example fewer loans were granted in 2008 and 2009.  
 
If similar savings growth tendency is witnessed at the MEC Koyli Winrdé of Podor 
(average growth of 31%), it is not the case of MEC FAM of Dakar (6%) showing 
tremendous difficulties for collecting savings. On the other hand, the MEC FAM of 
Dakar recorded very low amount in savings with low contribution to the network (8%) 
owing to a prior situation of bad financial governance especially in 2009 leading to a 
crisis of confidence between staff, board members and the MFI members, despite of 
the creation of a periodic service point. 
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The savings amount collected at the CREC Méckhé entailing its noteworthy 
contribution to the network (31%) is chiefly boosted by the mother association (Union 
des Groupements de Producteurs de Meckhé)  and the economic interest grouping 
KAYER (Kayor Energie Rural) which have opened accounts in the MFI for financial 
transactions with their members or clients respectively.  
 
Overall, the savings collected can be gathered in three main categories: 
- The demand deposits. It is the most dominant savings product (in average 
53% of total deposits) over the last four years for all the seven MFIs.  
- Term deposit: it is interest bearing deposit in favour of depositors. In most of 
the MFIs, the interest varies from 3 to 5% with maturity of 3 to 7 months for 
short term deposits and more than 12 months for long terms deposits. 
- Compulsory savings: in all the MFIs surveyed, the compulsory savings is one 
on the requirement to have access to credit. It replaces tangible collateral and 
helps MFIs mitigate credit risk as the provision of collateral assets in rural 
areas is very tricky. In general, the compulsory savings vary between 10 and 
25% except in the MEC SAPP where the compulsory savings is about 33%. 
 
Likewise, some periodic compulsory savings are collected from the members in the 
MEC FAM of Dakar and MEC Koyli Winrdé (FONGS FINRURAL, 2011). 
4.3.3.2 Credit 
Loan products  
Mainly focused on rural financing, surveyed MFIs extend miscellaneous loan 
products to meet their members’ financial needs.  
The figure 6 gives an overview of the importance of two main products in 4 MFIs 
(Tattaguine, Méckhé, Koyli Wirndé and Pékésse) in 2011. 
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Figure 6: Split of loan products in 4 MFIs in 2011 as % of the GLP 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
The main loan product delivered is the seasonal credit or working capital loan which 
helps farmers finance their basic activities. This loan terms, varying according to the 
MFIs, depend essentially on the targeted groups with a maturity betwixt 6 and 15 
months and usually a bullet repayment in capital and interest. Likewise, the charged 
nominal interest rates are comprised between 15% and 25%.  
 
If these terms seem common, it appears important to evince some specificity. For 
example, the MFI of Pékésse caters 4 variants of the seasonal credit regarding loan 
maturity and including cattle fattening (6 months), agriculture, vegetable production, 
poultry farming (8 months), and staple food storage (7 months). Small business such 
as retail sales, handcrafts, agricultural food processing also benefit from working 
capital loans with different maturity. 
 
The second most important loan product is the investment loan with very low interest 
rate over 12 to 48 months. These kinds of long term loans over 3 years have 
increased tremendously from 9% to 28% between 2005 and 2010 in Senegal 
(MEF/DRSSFD, 2010). All the seven MFIs are experiencing this innovative product 
through the support of the “Fonds d’Appui aux Iniatives Rurales” (FAIR)16 which 
finances agricultural, commercial and handcrafts long term investments such as 
material, land management etc…without tangible collateral, the loan applicant mother 
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Investment loans 
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 27 
association constituting the moral guarantee.  As for the seasonal credit, loan terms 
(maturity, repayment schedule) are discussed with the borrowers based on the FAIR 
method which includes small project devising. The interest charged by the FAIR is 
about 4% for MFIs. In return MFIs are allowed by the FAIR agreement to charge a 
maximum interest of 12% with no compulsory savings regardless the MFI. Therefore, 
MFIs can make a maximal margin of about 8% on the investment loans in other to 
sustain their social action toward their members. 
 
Many other loan products exist and are specific to each MEC, depending on the 
operating area and the real needs of the targeted population. Those loans include 
energy loans, consumption loans, and education credits, express or emergency 
loans.  
Credit policies and Loan size 
Whereas for regulated MFIs, involving in credit delivery supposes the enforcement of 
well devised credit policies in order to prevent drifts and subsequently ensure a better 
credit risk management, the situation seems quite paradoxical at FONGS 
FINRURAL.  Indeed, only one of the surveyed MFIs hold a procedure manual thus 
hampering the accuracy and the dedication to loan granting processes. Nonetheless, 
credit committees and the staff members have empiric knowledge about the products 
supplied and their characteristics. 
 
The average duration for a loan application approval is one month in most of the 
MFIs except for emergency loans; this because some MFIs require a minimum 
number of loan applications for the credit committee to sitting whilst credit committee 
of other sits in a monthly base.  Acknowledging that for efficiency purposes the 
maximum duration for a microfinance loan approval should be less than 30 days, it 
can be deduced that the current situation in the MFIs might undermine good credit 
policy practices.  
 
The loans size varies between MFIs from 5000 FCFA and 5000000 FCFA and 
depends on the type and the object of the credit. The MFI of Meckhé recorded the 
highest average loan size (455000 FCFA) over the last four years. 
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For all the loans, no tangible asset is asked to people as guarantee. The main 
guarantee is the compulsory saving and the minimum capital requirement or savings 
requirement in the demand deposits account. 
Is there a risk of cash flow cycle mismatch? 
The overall remark is that besides the investment credit for which the repayment 
schedule is split in frequent instalments after one year or 6 months, the others loans 
are mainly repaid in  bullet. If those repayment policies do meet with most of MFIs 
members, it appears important to stress out that granting always more than 3 months 
maturity loans with a balloon repayment could jeopardize MFIs. Indeed, the fact to 
apply yearly or semi-annual instalments may undermine borrowers’ incentive to repay 
back their loans (Buchenau, 2003), thus breaking down the loan repayment culture. 
Likewise, repaying loans at once in fine in capital and interest may not be affordable 
for borrowers especially when they cannot get their revenue at once. 
 
Another aspect that should be underscored is the loan diversion, specifically the use 
of seasonal credit for shorter cash flow cycle activities. In Podor for example some 
beneficiaries invest their seasonal credit in their retail sales, restaurants, handcrafts 
activities. The mismatch between the disbursement/reimbursement of the loans and 
the cash flow cycle of households might increase the loan delinquency and MFIs’ 
turnovers accordingly. For Bédécarrats, Baur & Lapenu (2011), the bankruptcy of 
number of microfinance institutions due to important customers drop out and to the 
increase in arrears show up that MFI don’t always provide adapted financial services 
such as credit.   
 
When can a loan be adapted? Is it when it meets members’ needs or when its terms 
fit the cash flow of households? 
 
For the common understanding and numerous scholars such as Pearce, Goodland & 
Mulder (2004) and Collings, Morduch, Rutherford & Ruthven (2009), a financial 
product, particularly the credit is adapted not only when it is affordable but also when 
it is flexible, meaning that disbursement / reimbursement periods meet with the cash 
flow cycles of households.  
 
 29 
In agriculture financing especially, flexible credits are crux elements for a well 
attainment albeit they are likely to worsen loan portfolios and imply liquidity 
management issues17. 
It is therefore on the responsibility of MFIs and their members to find out the 
balanced situation which will not put at risk MFIs operations while fulfilling rural 
households’ needs. 
4.3.4 Sources of funding 
The surveyed MFIs rely on three main sources of funding: the deposits, the equity 
and the borrowings. 
 
71% of MFIs rely on deposits as main source of funding which contributed in 2011 for 
38%, 42%, 53%, 48% and 50% of the financial structures of MFIs of Malicounda, 
Dakar, Tattaguine, Pékesse and Méckhé severally. This situation corroborates the 
legal status of these MFIs to collect first savings then to redistribute them as credit. 
For the 29% remaining, their main source of funding is borrowings with 50% and 59% 
for MFIs of Podor and Daroukoudoss respectively. 
The figure 7 hereafter shows the borrowing capacity of the MFIs. 
 
Figure 7: Leverage (Debt/Equity) 
 
/X: The real value is X times de value on the figure 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
                                                          
17
 See http://www.ruralfinance.org/fileadmin/templates/rflc/documents/1114413150253_WB_AIN_07_01.pdf 
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The analysis of the figure 7 reveals that at the MFI of Dakar (MEC FAM) the leverage 
ratio varied tremendously from high negative ratios in 2009 and 2010 to a highly 
positive figure in 2011. The negative figures in 2009 and 2010 are mainly due to the 
loss in equity during those periods. The equity itself has been influenced by the 
negative figure of retained earnings over years. The highly positive ratio in 2011 
entails that the MFIs is borrowing more than it should and might jeopardize its 
depositors albeit the decrease in savings mobilization. Indeed, for Périlleux (2010), 
the higher the external financing, the more borrowers prevail, thus threatening 
savings and credit unions’ viability. Therefore, the MFI should adopt new policies 
aiming at boosting its equity capital in the perspective of lowering the leverage ratio. 
 
In contrast, most of the other MFIs showed a cushioning situation in 2010 and 2011. 
This implies that they can still have access to long term borrowed funds  except at 
the MEC of Malicounda which recorded impressive leverage (113%) in 2010 mainly 
due to loss in equity while at the same time their liabilities increased, peculiarly the 
long term borrowed funds.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: PERFORMANCES ANALYSES 
 
5.1 Financial Analysis 
This chapter which strives to deepen our cognition about how well the surveyed MFIs 
are financially performing will be carried out throughout four crux financial analysis 
dimensions: portfolio quality, efficiency, profitability and sustainability. For each 
dimension, one or two meaningful devices will merit our attention as it is not possible 
to go through the entire financial indicators existing in the microfinance industry. 
5.1.1 Portfolio Management 
5.1.1.1 A growing loan portfolio 
The entire MFIs recorded a global average annual growth rate of 17% in the last four 
years. However a deepened analysis of the portfolio points out that merely 86% of 
the MFIs are really growing with an average annual growth rate fluctuating between 
39% and 679%.  
 
Surprisingly the growth rate is more noticeable at the MEC MFR of Malicounda albeit 
appearing as the youngest, chiefly because boosted by the investment funds of the 
FAIR in 2010 and 2011. Besides, corresponding trend is observed at the MEC FAM 
of Dakar which presents likely 17% of average annual growth rate. The two MFIs 
growth might explain their higher leverage ratios aforementioned.   
 
In opposite, the CREC of Méckhé portfolio has constantly winced over the past four 
years (annual average of -47%) entailing the total portfolio score of the seven MFIs. 
This might be explained mainly by the decrease in the number of borrowers induced 
by the new credit policy which stress out a better clients’ screening, a reduction of 
agricultural loans, a focus on lending to associations rather than individuals, a 
repayment of borrowed funds; and meanwhile by the decrease in credit line and the 
momentaneous cease of the FAIR in 2010. Nonetheless, the MFI still maintains the 
crux outstanding loan portfolio thus contributing of 26% to the total outstanding loan 
portfolio in 2011. 
 
The MFIs of Pékésse, Daroukoudoss, Koyli Winrdé and Tattaguine show up a 
relatively stable score with some kind of rational growth which can be easily 
controlled comparing to other MFIs. 
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Despite this growth trend, only three MFIs (43%) held 69% of the outstanding loan 
portfolio in 2011: the CREC of Méckhé (26%), the MEC of Podor (23%) and the MEC 
of Tattaguine (20%). 
5.1.1.2 A fluctuating portfolio at risk 
One of the crux indicators appraising how well a MFI is managed or performing 
remains its portfolio quality, commonly assessed through the portfolio at risk (PAR).  
It integrates the entire outstanding loans holding at least one arrears as well as the 
rescheduled loans. In the UMOA region, and in accordance with the regulation and 
the BCEAO instructions on periodic reports, the portfolio at risk usually appraised is 
the PAR after 180 days (PAR>180 days). The figure 8 presents the PAR 180 days for 
the surveyed MFIs. 
Figure 8: Portfolio At Risk over 180 days 2008-2011 
 
 Source: Our survey (may-august 2012)  
The figure 8 reveals important PAR variability between MFIs and over years.   
 
Considering the entire MFIs, it appears that the PAR increased from 5.9% to 9.7% in 
four years. This ratio is higher than the UMOA requirement (3%) and the national 
average threshold of 5.4% (MEF/DRSSFD, 2010), and different from the findings of 
Lafoucarde, Isern, Mwangi & Brown (2005) of 4% for portfolio at risk>30 days for 
African MFIs. 
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Nevertheless, some MFIs present improvement over years in spite of the improvable 
score. For example, the MEC MFR of Malicounda performed from 14% to about 10% 
in four years.  
 
In contrast, high PAR fluctuations are observed in other MFIs showing beforehand a 
lack of a strong credit policy management. The reasons may be that of the 
agricultural volatility. In 2011, the PAR of the MEC of Podor blew up to 14% due to 
the slump in vegetable sales. In other MFIs such as Pékesse and Méckhé, members 
also face a slump of their fattened cattle and epizootic diseases and livestock 
robberies. This explains why the PAR of the MEC of Pékesse has varied inconstantly 
between 3 and 18% in the last four years. 
 
Yet in other MFIs, there is an increase of the portfolio at risk over time showing in 
addition to all aforementioned arguments, a flexible loan recovery policy which 
underscores the dialogue and forbids harsh recovery practices. This is the case of 
the MEC Koyli Winrdé, the CREC of Méckhé and the MEC SAPP of Tattaguine which 
PAR increased in four years from 4% to 15%; 4.9% to 8.5% and 3.3% to 6.8% 
severally.   
 
The findings also divulge that the PAR figures recorded may have been affected by 
the repayment schedules applied in most of the MFIs and by the bookkeeping and 
financial statements data. Indeed, some overdue loans of more than one year are still 
kept in books in some MFIs. 
 
It appears important for MFIs to implement a better loan monitoring system which will 
systematically track their PAR especially for long term loans with annual instalments 
or bullet repayment. That’s why the provision should respect the standards set up by 
the regulation. An analysis of the risk coverage ratio pinpoints that most of MFIs do 
usually not make the required provision to cover their PAR even though some 
provisioning are made. These practices are opposite to the common understanding 
of systematic loan losses provision to preserve client deposits especially in deposits- 
based MFIs. 
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5.1.2 Efficiency  
5.1.2.1 Sound controlled operating expenses ratio 
Operating expenses ratio appears as on major indicator to assess whether MFIs are 
cost effective and expresses all the operating expenses as a percentage of the 
period average gross loan portfolio (Rosenberg, 2009). The figure 9 shows up the 
evolution of operating expenses ratio of the MFIs over the last three years. 
 
Figure 9: Operating Expenses Ratios 2009-2011 
 
/X: The real value is X times de value on the figure 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
The figure brings out that in more than 85% of the cases, operating expenses ratios 
are below 20%. However, the MEC MFR of Malicounda recorded the highest 
operating expenses ratio of more than 95% in 2009 but significant improvements are 
made in 2010 and 2011. 
 
In opposite, the MEC of Dakar recorded the highest operating expenses ratio in 2011 
of about 40% after sound improvement in 2010. The negative administrative 
expenses ratio in 2010 (-1.9%) is due to the recovery in depreciation expenses. 
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The CREC of Meckhé recorded the lowest operating expenses ratio subsequent to its 
high average loan size.  
 
If for Lafoucarde et al. (2005) operating and financial expenses are high in African 
regions, the specific case of this study might be due to the fact that MFIs hire fewer 
and underpaid staff, use a very simple accounting system, sometimes without any 
Management Information System with low administrative expenses. For example, the 
use of paid internship positions at the MEC of Tattaguine, and the opening of periodic 
services points along with additional remunerated interns increased the operational 
expenses in 2011. The same trend is observed at the MEC FAM of Dakar where they 
permanently hire internship positions in addition to old staff. 
 
The analysis of the breakdown of operation expenses ratio reveals that the most 
important part of operating expenses is pertained to administrative costs. 
However, opposite situation is observed at the MEC of Dakar where personnel 
expenses are higher than administrative expenses over time. This might be explained 
by higher staff salaries in urban areas compared with MFIs operating in rural areas. 
5.1.1.2 Portfolio Yield 
The portfolio yield conveys how much an MFI earns in cash interest payment from its 
credit provision in a given period. It is perceived as a foremost indicator of an MFI’s 
ability to create revenue in order to defray its financial and operating expenses (von 
Stauffenberg et al., 2003). 
 
The figure 10 shows the evolution of the portfolio yield during the last three years 
Figure 10: Portfolio yields 2009-2011 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
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The analysis reveals that the MEC MFR of Malicounda recorded an increase in its 
portfolio yield during the last three years from about 11% to 23%.  
Kindred growth trends are observed with the MEC MFR of Pékésse (11-19%) and the 
CREC of Méckhé (5-7%).  
 
Notwithstanding that the CREC of Meckhé recorded an increase in portfolio yield, the 
latter remains the lowest of the group due to its low interest rate policy combined with 
the absence of additional fees linked to the loan granting process. In contrast, the 
highest portfolio yields recorded by the MEC of Tattaguine, Dakar and Pékesse 
(particularly in 2011) are due to the high rate and other additional fees and 
commissions on the loan. 
 
For the other MFIs, no real trend can be concluded even though they recorded also 
important yield of their portfolios. 
 
The differences reported in portfolio yields could be due to additional fees, the 
differences in interest rates each MFI applies, even though they have nearly loan 
products. For instance, the MFI of Méckhé does not apply a fee for loan processing 
and charge a low interest rate for investment loans (12) versus 1% for the MEC of 
Pékesse with an interest rate of about 15% charged on investment loans. That 
variability in loan product is due to the fact that each loan product is tailored for each 
MFI in line with the expectations of their members, expectation clearly stated during 
annual general meetings. 
 
As the portfolio yield can be used as a proxy of effective interest rate, it appears that 
the MFIs of Malicounda, Tattaguine, Dakar and Pékésse apply the highest effective 
interest rates, which are however below the usury rate in the UMOA region (27%). 
On the other hand, an excessive social vision could lead to the application of very low 
interest rates threatening the viability of the institution (Ben Soltane, 2012). 
5.1.3 Profitability: Cost Ratio Analysis 
The cost ratio indicator is used to evaluate how much MFIs spend in operating cost to 
make their income. It also helps to know whether MFIs are losing money or not. The 
figure 11 shows the cost ratio of the seven MFIs assessed and the Network as a 
whole.  
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Figure 11: Cost Ratios 2008-2011 
 
/X: The real value is X times de value on the figure 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
It comes out that the MFIs cost ratios vary inconstantly over year. Most of the MFIs 
reported below but nearer 100% meaning that they are neither losing money, nor 
extorting money from their operations. However, opposite trend is witnessed at the 
MEC FAM of Dakar scoring above 200% except in 2010 when good performance 
was recorded. It can be deduced an indubitable loss of money at that MFI over years. 
 
The impressive cost ratio of the MEC MFR of Pékésse in 2011 (above 600%) is 
mainly due to a grant training programme and technical assistance they benefited 
and for which they have contributed. In the same vein, the MEC SAPP of Tattaguine 
reported an increasing cost ratio meaning excessive expenses given that their 
portfolio is increasing. 
 
The cost ratio of the entire 07 MFIs was minatory in 2011 due exclusively to high 
operating expenses of the MEC SAPP of Tattaguine and the MEC MFR of Pékésse. 
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negative figure of the loan loss provision expenses is due to the important recovery 
on loan loss provision made by the MFIs for that year.  
5.1.4 Sustainability 
5.1.4.1 Volatile and low Returns on Assets 
It is generally ascertained that the Return on Assets ratio is an important indicator for 
profitability analysis because it measures the efficiency of managing assets 
investment and measures the profit gained pertained to the level of investment in 
total assets18. We however recognize that it is also a device for assessing 
sustainability within a company, especially in MFIs. 
The evolution of the Returns on assets of the seven MFIs is shown in the figure 12. 
Figure 12: Returns on Assets 2009-2011 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
The analysis of the figure shows that while some MFIs present alternatively negative 
and positive figures of ROA, other report quite stable one over the last three years. 
 
Specifically in 2009 and 2010 the MEC MFR of Malicounda obtained high negative 
values of return on assets mainly attributed to highly negative net incomes. Indeed, 
net incomes increased negatively between 2009 and 2010 of about 2455% and 9% 
respectively. This situation might be attributed to the fact that from 2010 the MFI 
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recorded a tremendous increase in its Gross loan portfolio induced by the support of 
the FAIR. But as most of the loans maturities are one year and the MFI applies a 
bullet repayment schedule, the loans disbursed in 2010 are repaid partially in 2011. 
As the MFI apply a cash-based bookkeeping, this induces strong fluctuations in the 
indicators. 
 
Another reason is that during that period, the MFI didn’t operate really but kept 
supporting administrative and staff expenses. The positive figure of ROA observed in 
2011 is partially due to the increase in loan portfolio and in interest and fees received 
from the loans disbursed.  
 
The GLP of Dakar is boosted by the external funding (loans and operating 
expenses). But as the organisation was already struggling with the management of 
the GLP, this boost has worsened the organisation situation. 
 
The ROA of MFR PEKESSE decreased over years from a positive figure (4.7%) in 
2009 to a negative situation (-12.5%) in 2011. As aforementioned, the situation in 
2011 is to a high investment in staff and board members training along with technical 
assistance. 
 
The inflated personal and administrative expenses (46%) and the loan losses 
provisioning expenses (9%) at the MEC SAPP of Tattaguine might ascribe the 
negative figure of their ROA in 2011. 
 
For all the remaining MFIs, the ROA are below 10% showing a low profitability. This 
finding is in line with Lafoucarde et al. (2005) according to whom MFIs in Africa tend 
to report lower levels of profitability, as measured by return on assets, than MFIs in 
other global regions.  
5.1.4.2 Operational self sufficiency: struggling to survive 
Operational self sufficiency appears as on key element of an MFI performance. 
Measuring the extent to which a MFI can cover its ordinary cost through operating 
income, it helps to evince whether a given MFI can sustain without any subsidy. The 
figure 13 reveals the operational self sufficiency of the seven MFIs over the past four 
year. 
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Figure 13: Operational Self Sufficiency 2008-2011 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
The surveyed MFIs show up different features of OSS over time. While some have 
reached the OSS and continue keeping the trend, others continue striving to reach 
the OSS. 
 
For example, the figure 13 underscores that for the last four years OSS of the MEC 
MFR of Malicounda fluctuated tremendously between 103% and 104% whereas the 
MEC FAM of Dakar recorded only once a ratio higher than 100% (in 2010).  In the 
industry and specifically in UMOA region, a minimum threshold of 130% is required to 
become really operationally self sufficient. As consequence, the two MFIs cannot 
really survive without any donation or subsidy. However since 2009, the operational 
self sufficiency ratio of Malicounda is increasing showing some improvement.  
The MEC SAPP of Tattaguine and MFR of Pékésse recorded in 2011 a very low 
operational self sufficiency ratio (96% and 44% respectively) due mainly their 
aforementioned administrative and personal expenses.   
 
The CREC of Méckhé sustained its OSS over 130% during the last three years 
implying its ability to operate without any kind of donation. 
The case of the MEC FAM is mainly due to its operating areas, urban and peri-urban. 
It is the only one MFI of the network operating with headquarters in Dakar, the capital 
city of the Senegal. Therefore personnel expenses might be higher than the other 
operating in rural areas as shown through the figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Breakdown of portfolio yield 2011 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
 
The figure 14 shows indeed that the MEC of Dakar reported the highest operating 
expenses ratio compared with its peers; entailing then a negative yield margin. 
 
Considering the network as a whole, after having recorded very high operational self 
sufficiency ratios in 2009 and 2010 (figure 13), the operational self sufficiency of the 
entire seven MFIs is about 88% in 2011, showing that the network still need subsidy 
to operate properly. This ratio is mainly affected by the high operating expenses but 
very low financial performances of the MEC of Tattaguine and Pékesse which 
contributed of about 27% and 30% severally to the expenses of the entire network in 
2011. 
5.2 Social performance Analysis 
Since 2000, miscellaneous initiatives were developed around the world to improve 
the social performance measurement and management which are perceived as the 
real implementation of social goals of MFIs (Hashemi, 2007:3 quoted by Bédécarrats, 
Baur & Lapennu, 2011). The social performance measurement helps at assessing an 
MFI’s social performance as it permits to identify the level of application the social 
mission of an MFI (Dewez & Neisa, 2009). It also helps at improving reciprocal trust, 
client participation and satisfaction. As consequence, MFIs record higher repayment 
rates and low their transactions costs (Lapenu, 2007 quoted by Bédécarrats, Baur & 
Lapenu, 2011).  
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The social performance analysis is mainly based on the ECHOS© tool of Incofin and 
includes five main dimensions: social mission management, outreach and access, 
quality of customers (members) service in compliance with client protection 
principles, human resources management, environment and corporate social 
responsibility. The main intention was not to assess and grade the social 
performance of the MFIs, rather the tool helped us to have a sound insights on the 
situation among FONGS FINRURAL Network affiliated MFIs as far as social 
performance is concerned. 
 
The figures 15 and 16 hereafter shows FONGS FINRURAL network affiliated MFIs. 
  
Figure 15: Social Performances of the Seven MFIs 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012)   
 
All the seven MFIs recorded social performance scores under 55% (based on 
ECHOS© scale) meaning a low social performance situation.  
 
The MEC SAPP of Tattaguine and the CREC of Méckhé recorded the highest score 
(47% each one) whereas the MEC FAM of Dakar recorded the lowest score (34%). 
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All the seven MFIs present good scores in outreach an access (65% in average). 
This is due mainly to their access conditions which are competitive (affordable shares 
for membership, low cost for adhesion) and the targeted area. Some MFIs are sole in 
their operational areas (Malicounda) whilst others have opened additional periodic 
branches (SAP and FAM). This finding corroborates Angora, Bédécarrats & Lapenu 
(2009) for who sub Sahara MFIs tend to perform better in people targeting.  
 
Figure 16: Social performance of FONGS FINRURAL 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
 
In the opposite, low scores are observed in social mission and human resources 
management (34% and 26% respectively). MFIs are perceived as financial levers of 
mother associations and their missions are supposed to be ingrained in the social 
mission of development associations. However the social missions of the seven MFIs 
are not clearly stated with key indicators people could track. The lack of training and 
information regarding social management is one of the causes of the situation. 
Moreover, the staffs of these self-managed MFIs are most often hired within local 
human resources, are unqualified even if they hold strong records in the field of 
microfinance. Their position is mainly perceived as volunteer services. Nevertheless, 
the staff rotation is really low as the staff members are also members of the MFIs.  
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In addition, the overall score in customer services dimension is low (26) despite of 
the adapted products delivery. This might be due to the non provision of diversified 
products such as Business development services, insurance, remittances etc... The 
provision of BDS is mainly assumed by the mother associations which officers are 
involved in the devising of members or households investment projects, their follow 
up and loans repayment monitoring as well. But these services are only limited to 
members which belong to both MFI and mother association. Moreover, the MFIs 
assets level might not be sufficient to get involved in the provision of others products.  
 
The CREC UGPM of Méckhé recorded the highest score in services to customers 
(57%) because of their experience in solar energy loans in partnership with KAYER.  
 
For the last dimension, social practices and environment, the MFIs are not trained 
enough to include environmental dimension in their credit policies. Nevertheless, 
credit committees are aware that they should not grant loan for activities that may 
damage the environment. Rather, MFIs are striving to have access to some credit 
line to finance solar energy and biogas.  
5.3 Governance Analysis 
The figure 17 shows governance situation of the MFIs based on the aggregated 
index of governance. 
Figure 17: Aggregated Index of Governance 
 
Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
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The analysis of the governance based on the aggregated index of governance 
reveals an average index of 62% meaning that all the MFIs are performing in 
governance issue. 43% of the MFIs recorded a governance index below 60%, others 
43% between 60 and 65% when only 14% recorded an index over 65%. 
 
Overall, prudential ratios are not fully respected by any of the MFIs. Moreover 
Committee of Control which endeavours the role of internal audit does usually not 
operate as required. Excepted this year when the FONGS committed a legal and 
external audit for 2011 fiscal year, no external audit was done upon the initiative of 
the MFIs.  
 
Only one MFI holds procedure manuals. Yet the latter is not up to date, neither in 
accordance with the new regulation.  
 
Regarding the management independency, the survey MFIs are self managed 
institutions and operate as stated. Any of them is under the supervision authority’s 
management. However, it is important to underscore the influence of the mother 
association on the management of the MFIs, especially the mother association board 
members. In most of the cases, certain mother association board members are 
elected in the MFIs boards. As consequence, the mother association can sustain 
their social vision inside the MFIs.   
 
Most of the MFIs show good performance in administration. The overall average 
score is 80% meaning the existence of required management committees, the 
execution of general assembly decisions, the difference between the board of 
directors and the staff. 
5.4 Linking financial performance, social performance and governance in MFIs 
The most commonly used test to appreciate the linkages between two variables 
remains the linear regression often measured by the coefficient of correlation r of 
Pearson. However when the variables are ordinal, discrete or when the values 
themselves are not meaningful or don’t fulfil the normality conditions are verified, it is 
recommended to use the rank coefficient ρ of Spearman since the latter is based on 
rank orders and  is not affected by outliers. 
 
To deepen our perception on the relation between financial, social performance and 
governance, we compute the rho coefficient of Spearman. The OSS used as financial 
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performance indicator and the governance index have been crossed with the five 
dimensions of social performance and the global social performance score as well. 
Table 1: Correlations between OSS, Social Performance Indicators and Aggregated Index of 
Governance 
Spearman’s rho 
OSS Social 
mission 
Access 
and 
outreach 
Customers 
services 
Human 
resources 
Environment 
and social 
practices 
Social 
Performance 
Score 
Operational 
Self sufficiency 
(OSS) 
Cor. 1.000 .364 -.414 .164 .927
**
 .179 .487 
Sig  .423 .355 .726 .003 .702 .268 
N 28 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Governance 
Index 
Cor. .231 -.039 .448 .766
*
 ,280 .810
*
 .808
*
 
Sig. .618 .933 .314 .045 .543 .027 .028 
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     Source: Our survey (may-august 2012) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The table evinces no significant relationship between governance and OSS meaning 
that for our surveyed MFIs the governance level does not affect the financial 
performance. As illustration, the MEC of Tattaguine showed acceptable governance 
index in 2011 (64) but low financial performance (96.4%) the same year. This finding 
diverges with Ben Soltane (2012) according to whom the governance in MFIs mainly 
focuses on financial performance.   
 
On the other hand, there is a neutral relationship between financial performance and 
social performance; which confirms many the findings of Ben soltane (2012) between 
financial and social performance However, OSS is positively correlated to human 
resources. This could be also evident as a better care of human resources might lead 
to better efficiency even if operational expenses do not change. For Bédécarrats, 
Angora & Lapenu (2009), the more the employees are esteemed by the MFI, the 
more they are eager to obtain good performances for the MFI in return. 
 
The results reveal that for the surveyed MFIs, the governance index is positively 
correlated to the global social performance score. Moreover, the governance index is 
positively correlated to customers’ services and environmental and social practices. 
This is in accordance with Ben Soltane (2012) according to whom the institutional 
form of an MFI (viewed here through the governance) influences its social practices.  
 47 
As the surveyed MFIs are savings and credit cooperatives, the financial products are 
regularly tailored according to members’ needs and suggestions from Annual 
General Meetings   
 
Despite these aforementioned results, it seems important to underpin that the exact 
shape of the relations pertain to the context. That is why a strong socially oriented 
approach does not directly lead to low financial performance and a strong financially 
oriented approach does not lead irremediably to a very low social performance19. 
Moreover as mere correlation analysis between social and financial variables is 
restricted (Bédécarrats, Angora & Lapenu, 2009), deepened researches should be 
done do identify the form of relationship exist. 
5.6Toward sustainability: An endless fight 
The attempt to analyse the viability of a rural MFI network evinces that rural MFIs, 
particularly those savings and credit self managed MFIs, are daily compelled to dwell 
uncertainties and hopes for their survival. 
 
The first challenge they need to come up remains the delivery of affordable services 
which should not jeopardise members’ deposits and the financial viability of the 
institution as well. This challenge appears really tricky regarding the increasing 
portfolio at risk reported, exclusively due to flexible loan delivery (investment loan and 
seasonal loans for instance). For Buchenau (2003), investments loans (especially 
those provided without appropriate guarantee and legal framework) are riskier than 
short term loan because the longer the loan maturity the more likely inauspicious 
situation might occur. Three main risks are underscored: the market risks, the 
conditions of production (climate changes, pests’ management, natural disasters...) 
and the purpose of the investment. All these aspects should be considered in the 
project appraisal process before the loan granting. Moreover, even if rural MFIs 
members/clients are more eager for bullet repayment loans, for Rutherford (2011), 
one key element of microfinance success remains the loan repayment based on 
frequent instalment of small or tiny amount.  
   
The second challenge for rural microfinance institutions is their fitful financial 
performance.  It appears that these rural MFIs recorded low financial performance 
not because they are grudging performing but mainly due to the specific features of 
                                                          
19
 See https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/ESR/article/viewFile/1524/1485  
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their target group, their financial products, their loan procedures, the volatility of rural 
activities. This finding espouses AFD (2008) which stipulated that the time a MFI 
takes to reach sustainability is related to the context and the target group though it 
thrusts a good management of the MFI. That is why amongst all these MFIs, some 
emerge meaning that in some key conditions, there are still possibilities for rural 
members-managed MFIs to attain good financial performance. For these latter their 
financial sustainability is also due their low operating expenses for financial services 
(Goujon, 2009).  
 
Governance appears as the third issue in rural MFI pathway toward sustainability as 
it is positively correlated to social performance and some indicators of financial 
performance. This finding corroborates the thought of AFD (2008) which stipulates 
that MFIs sustainability depends on their institutional viability meaning good 
governance ingrained in an adequate regulatory framework.  Rather, for Mersland & 
Strøm (2009) the governance measured by board members enhances MFIs’ 
performance peculiarly with endogenous and well informed board.  
 
The fourth concern of rural MFI network and accordingly rural MFI is their lack of 
knowledge about social performance mainstream even if arguing that they are 
socially ingrained with allegations that they have real social impact on their 
communities. Not only they do lack information, but also they lack method and tools 
to record, report and track both financial and social facets of their institutions. This 
obviously should lead to the bad performance results recorded. For Rosenberg 
(2009) indeed, there is a strong relationship between attentive reporting and good 
outcome of MFIs. As consequence, for the same author, MFIs holding accurate 
information tend to be more successful and vice versa.  
 
Finally, most of the MFIs surveyed faced the issue of vision and mission and 
consequently a lack of leadership. After five years of implementation, regardless their 
status and operating areas, MFIs should clearly be able to show up their mission a 
vision.  They should have well stated objectives and indicators to assess them in 
short, mean or long term. Rural MFIs do not need to transform before being more 
professional. They need more cogency in their methodology.  
  
 
 49 
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
There is a widespread evidence that MFIs should become operationally self 
sufficient, rather sustainable (Hermes, Lensink & Meesters, 2011), as subsidies and 
development agencies aid are becoming scarce in environment marked by a global 
financial crisis where number of  previous donors countries should themselves face 
new challenges for emerging. Besides, MFIs need to be sustainable in order to 
expand their activity and thus continuing providing practical solution for poor and 
unbanked people in other to contributing to the poverty alleviation process. 
 
In rural areas particularly, considerable improvement are needed as the sustainable 
of MFIs involving in untapped rural and remote areas are matter of concern. 
 
The analysis carried out on the viability of the FONGS FINRURAL Network underpins 
the weakness of the isolated and single rural microfinance, especially the community 
based or community managed MFIs, which daily face uncertainties and threats: 
survive or disappear. It also reveals that in the same time, a number escape threats 
and reach sustainability bringing out that rural MFIs, particularly rural cooperatives 
can be managed in a sustainable manner. Thus networking of both nonperforming 
and performing MFIs belonging to the same group (for example their legal status and 
their operating areas) seems more likely to be sustainable. The financial results 
showed by FONGS FINRURAL reasserts that evidence except in 2011 when two of 
the affiliated MFIs recorded high operating expenses due to training and accounting 
expertise hiring.  Therefore it can be concluded that involving in MFIs networking 
process, especially for rural microfinance institutions, supposes that all the MFIs are 
well informed about the financial situation of each other as well as their financial 
implications.  
 
Moreover, the findings of this research draw out that the main challenges for rural 
microfinance social performance remain, in addition to being informed about the 
recent trends in the field, the availability of adequate information with required 
indicators to track the effective application of their social mission. If outreach and 
services quality appears as the main dimensions well performed by MFIs, they 
should not occult other dimensions such as social responsibility toward clients, staff 
and environment.  
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Nevertheless, financial and social performances cannot be achieved without any 
good governance inside the MFIs: good financial governance and good institutional 
governance. All these combined with more discipline and more commitment of staff, 
members and all stakeholders intervening in the financial services delivery process of 
MFIs. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Social performances scores based on ECHOS©2012 
MFIS 
 Social 
mission 
Outreach and 
access 
Customer 
services   
Human 
resources 
Environment 
& Social 
practices Total Score 
MEC MFR 
MALICOUNDA 27 70 41 27 38 201 41 
MEC FAM DAKAR 27 48 36 16 44 170 34 
MEC SAPP 
TATTAGUINE 51 73 42 26 50 242 47 
MEC UGPN 
DAROUKOUDOSS 21 70 40 30 46 207 42 
MEC KOYLI 
WINRDE PODOR 50 57 36 30 36 208 41 
MEC MRF 
PEKESSE 21 74 41 21 43 200 41 
CREC MECKHE 43 61 47 30 57 238 47 
FONGS 
FINRURAL 34 65 40 26 45 210 42 
 
Governance 
MFI 
Respect of regulation Information system quality 
licensed Respect of 
prudential norms 
Coherence of 
procedures 
manuals 
Internal 
Auditors 
Legal 
Auditors 
Availability of 
Audits Reports 
Participation to an 
International 
Audit 
"1" if the MFI is 
licensed "0" if not 
"1" if 100% of 
prudential rules 
are fulfil "0" if not 
"1" if coherence, 
"0" if not 
"1" if 
available, 
"0" if not 
"1" if 
available, 
"0" if not 
"1" if available, 
"0" if not 
"1" if the MFI 
participates, "0" if 
not 
Mec Koyli 
wirndé  1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
CREC Méckhé  
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 
MEC ugpn  
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
MEC mfr 
Pekesse 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
MEC fam  
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
MEC sapp  
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 
MEC mfr 
Malicounda 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
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Governance followed 
MFI 
Management 
independence 
Administration 
Vis-à-vis Public 
officers 
Vis-à-Vis 
Partners 
Difference 
between the 
President of the 
Board of Directors 
and the General 
Manager 
Decision Making 
Power 
Direct Control by 
shareholders 
(General 
Assembly and 
Control 
Committee) 
Salaries and 
Bonus 
Mechanisms 
Financial 
Intermediation 
"1" if 
independence, 
"0" if not 
"0" if 
influenced 
by partners 
"1" if not 
"1" if deference, 
"0" if not 
"1" if the board of 
directors 
autonomous, "0" 
if not 
"1" if General 
Assembly  and 
Control 
Committee are 
available, "0" if 
not 
"1" if yes, "0" if 
not 
"1" if yes, "0" if  
not 
Mec Koyli 
wirndé  1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
CREC Méckhé  
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
MEC ugpn  
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
MEC mfr 
Pekesse 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
MEC fam  
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
MEC sapp  
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
MEC mfr 
Malicounda 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
 
 
 
 
